Introduction and Purpose
This report documents a supplemental analysis to the Hydrotreater/Distillation Column Hazard Analysis Report issued in April 2013. The supplemental analysis session was held March 9 th -11 th , 2015, in response to an independent review comment transmitted to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) via letter from the U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Northwest Field Office (PNSO; 14-PNSO-0215). The comment states:
"…based on our independent review and in light of our code responsibilities as the owner, we are directing Battelle to provide PNSO with the following items prior to start-up of the distillation column: … "3. Identification of prudent protective actions for the worker and the public (e.g., setback distances, shielding, procedures for minimizing time in the higher risk areas during operation, etc.) based on quantitative analysis and practical risk minimization approaches (for the distillation column).
Items 1 and 3 are also expected to be provided to PNSO for the hydrotreater unit prior to its operation…" (Emphasis added)
The purpose of the review was two-fold: identify prudent, practical protective actions for workers and the public, and use a quantitative analysis as the basis for this selection.
Scope and Methodology
The baseline analysis upon which this supplemental analysis builds is the Hydrotreater/Distillation Column Hazard Analysis Report (PNNL, 2013) and uses the hazardous conditions cited therein (Table 3 -4 of PNNL, 2013) as the basis for evaluation. The hazardous conditions considered were then screened and grouped as follows:
-Items retained included process safety-related hazards that fall outside of the normal operating envelope of PNNL. Standard laboratory hazards, such as trips, slips, falls, work with compressed gases, etc., are within the PNNL normal operating envelope for which safety programs have been implemented and require no further analysis. -Items retained included those related to operation of the hydrotreater or to utility systems that affect or could be affected by hydrotreater operation. [Items related to operation of the distillation column were evaluated during a supplementary hazard analysis session conducted in June 2014 (PNNL, 2014) .] Items related to utility systems that were evaluated in the distillation column report, and for which the hazardous event did not significantly change for hydrotreater operation, were not revisited (i.e., U-30 and U-33). -Retained items were grouped so that bounding, representative conditions are evaluated.
This includes the consideration of initiators, hazard controls, and consequence types.
This screening and grouping approach provided a subset of hazardous conditions to be analyzed, while assuring that any additional hazard controls selected are broadly applicable to the hazards associated with hydrotreater operations.
The methodology used follows a quantitative approach. The frequency of the initiating event, together with the likelihood that hazard controls (including critical controls) will not function as designed is quantitatively estimated. Failure of all controls is required for the hazardous condition (consequence) to occur. These likelihoods are binned by frequency ranges. The consequences of the hazardous conditions evaluated are also estimated, and binned by severity. Together, the frequency and consequence can be represented for each group of analyzed events in a risk matrix (Figure 1 ), based on Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3 rd edition (AIChE, 2008) .
The risk matrix reflects criteria for risk acceptance that have been adopted for the project and used for the Supplemental Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment -Distillation Column (PNNL, 2014) . A general criterion for a lower level of concern for the most serious accidents may be adopted from various sources. From the U.S. Department of Energy, EH-33 (DOE, 1996) , the threshold for significant risk as adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in its final benzene rule is 10 -3 fatality/year; the average annual accidental fatality risk in U.S. industries is 10 -4 fatality/year. For the public, 10 -4 fatality/year is often used as a maximum tolerable individual risk criterion (Lewis For this evaluation, PNNL has established a lower frequency value of 10 -5 hazardous conditions/year for determining risk, which includes the potential for serious accidents affecting workers or the public. This frequency corresponds to the generic catastrophic failure rate for pressure vessels, including those routinely encountered by the public, posing pressure hazards and containing hazardous and flammable materials (Lees, 2012) . Should the frequency of a specific hazardous condition fall to a small fraction of the likelihood of a catastrophic pressure vessel failure (10 -5 /year), the risk is considered small enough that additional controls are unnecessary.
When additional controls needed to lower the likelihood of a hazardous condition were considered neither practical nor prudent, actions to reduce consequences were identified instead. This approach follows a control hierarchy consistent with established DOE guidance (DOE, 2006) that emphasizes preventive over mitigative controls, and engineered controls over administrative controls.
For events that do not result in an energetic release from a pressure vessel failure, consequences are less severe and a higher likelihood of occurrence may be justified, based on risk (see Figure 1 ).
The frequency (f) ranges are defined as follows (per year):
The consequence bins are defined as follows: 1 worker injury not expected 2 worker injury possible 3 worker injury probable; public impact not expected 4 multiple worker injuries possible; public impact possible (transient public) 1   III  II  I  I   2   IV  III  II  I   3   IV  IV  III  II   4   IV  IV  IV  IV   1  2  3  4 It is noted that the quantitative approach has embedded conservatisms for this application:
• While frequencies of initiating events and control failures are typically based on continuous operation of a process over the course of a year, the intermittent operation 3 The assignation of "unacceptable" and "undesirable" risk bins are essentially the same for the hydrotreater. Controls to reduce the risk ranking to III or less are required to be in place prior to operation.
Frequency Bins
Consequence Bins of the hydrotreater is expected to occur over a small fraction of a full year, thereby reducing risk up to an order of magnitude from that reported.
• Each hazardous condition evaluated does not necessarily include all hazard controls that are in place. Because the events selected are representative, only those with a common set of controls are considered in the analysis.
Results
The supplemental analysis demonstrates that the hazardous conditions evaluated generally fall into Risk Bin IV with hazard controls in place. Table 2 summarizes the results of the supplemental analysis. The event severities were estimated from the available energy that may be released and environmental conditions postulated to exist for each scenario. The basis for frequency estimates are provided in Table 1 4 . Frequencies of failures for which little or no relevant data exists are based on reasonably conservative engineering judgment or follow an accepted convention. For example, the frequency of an administrative control failure is generally considered to be an "anticipated event" (DOE, 2007) and is therefore estimated as 1E-01/year in this analysis.
The following additional hazard controls were identified during the analysis as prudent, practical measures to enhance worker safety:
1. Modification of the safe operating procedure (SOP) to state that 1) any leak testing of the system (with nitrogen) will be conducted with the ventilation system operational and 2) the nitrogen system will be closed when not in use. 3. Administrative controls to check relief header -Modify the SOP to require verification that the low pressure relief line is free of obstruction (e.g., mud dauber nest) (U-7 bounding event).
Two hazardous events, included and noted in Table 2 , were prevented due to either the design of gas fittings or to a hydrotreater design change. Specifically, 1) the introduction of oxygen and hydrogen at the same time (H.1-17) was prevented due to compressed oxygen and air having a different fitting connection than compressed nitrogen and 2) an operator inadvertently releasing contents of reactor into the enclosure was prevented with the addition of a 3-way valve (H.6-1).
In addition, questions were raised during the session, regarding critical characteristics of high/low pressure interface valves (H. 1-11, H.1-21, H.4-23 and H.4-24 ) associated with hazardous events, which were addressed with the aid of additional calculations (Appendix A). Calculations demonstrate that the valves have been appropriately sized for potential flow rates associated with hazardous events and identified controls are sufficient.
For several hazardous events involving leaks of bio-oil, sulfiding agents, and water byproduct, the consequence likelihood would be further reduced from reported levels with the application of required personal protective equipment (Appendix B. Chemical Safety Data Sheets).
Based on the supplemental hazard analysis and the application of the existing and additional hazard controls, the frequencies and mitigated consequences of the potential hazardous conditions were generally considered to fall into Risk Bin IV.
The following additional follow-on action items were identified during the analysis to verify assumptions or enhance worker safety:
1. During startup testing, ensure that valves fail in the appropriate direction, based on their credited function, on loss of air.
2. Review areas of operator proximity to high pressure/high temperature system components for use of personal protective equipment (PPE) against flashing steam release events.
Conclusion
This supplementary analysis and the quantitative risk evaluation performed has demonstrated that an adequate set of hazard controls are in place to address the potential hazardous conditions associated with hydrotreater operation. Frequencies of initiating events and enabling process control failures were established and considered in evaluating the adequacy of the controls in place.
Additional controls were identified where the quantitative analysis or qualitative considerations (e.g., defense in depth) demonstrated a need for additional preventative or mitigative measures. These include: 1) requiring leak testing of the system (with nitrogen) to be conducted with the ventilation system operational and closing the nitrogen system when not in use, 2) limiting stay time for operators within the enclosure, and 3) requiring the verification of an open flow path (with nitrogen) to the relief header prior to each run. These additional controls are considered practical and prudent for further reducing risk to workers and the public, and will be established prior to operation of the hydrotreater unit. In addition, there were follow-on action items identified to verify assumptions or enhance worker safety, including, 1) ensure valves fail in the appropriate direction upon loss of air and 2) evaluate use of PPE for protection against steam release events. 
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